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In the United States, a common policy strategy to expand
employment and increase wages is to try to expand the
demand for labor, either through support to employers in
the form of subsidies or tax breaks or through direct government purchases. However, while demand-side policies
should increase wages and/or employment in theory, it is
often unclear who benefits from such policies in practice.
In competitive labor markets, the benefits of employment
subsidies may accrue largely to employers or to other factors
of production besides the target worker population. It is thus
crucial to empirically assess the real-world effects of such
demand-side interventions using evidence from past experience, and, moreover, to identify the economic principles
that determine why different policies may succeed or fail at
achieving their desired impacts. This dissertation comprises
three independent essays that study demand-side interventions and shocks to the labor market and evaluate who wins
and who loses in practice. I draw on novel data to identify
natural experiments that generated as-good-as-random
changes in labor demand conditions across both firms and
regional labor markets. In each setting, I study who bears the
benefit and burden of a different shock to the labor market,
and, using economic theory as a guide, I highlight the principles that determine when demand-side policies successfully
benefit the workforce.
In the first essay (joint with Filipe Silverio), I study how
firms mediate the benefits of labor-demand expansions
that come from product-market-side incentives. When an
employer experiences an increase in product demand or
a subsidy to produce more—which in turn increases its
demand for labor—does it raise wages for current employees? Or, are wages pinned down by competition from other
employers in that labor market? To answer this question, we
study unique data on Portuguese exporters and their employees, in which we can identify cases where individual firms
did comparatively better or worse than their similar competitors, based on where their customers were during the global
Great Recession in 2008 and 2009.
In the second and third essays I study the effects of
two significant public infrastructure investment efforts on
regional labor markets in the United States, shedding light
on when such policies can bolster wages and job creation in
target regions. One essay studies the short-run effectiveness
of stimulus-funded highway construction projects as a means
of boosting local employment—construction-sector employment in particular—in stagnating regions during the Great
Recession. The other takes a long-run view and examines
how the rapid construction of war plants during World War
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II in unusual locations (which were later reconverted for
private civilian product and operated for decades afterwards)
impacted regional manufacturing development, and, in turn,
the availability of high-paying manufacturing jobs during the
postwar era. In each of these studies, I collect new, geographically detailed, investment-level data sets that were crucial to
conduct causal evaluations of each intervention.

Chapter 1
Do Wage Increases Reflect Firm-Level Labor
Demand or Market Competition? Evidence
from Idiosyncratic Export Demand Shocks
(with Filipe Silverio)
What induces employers to raise their employees’ wages:
their internal need for labor or competition from other
employers in the labor market? In the canonical competitive
labor market model, wages are determined by competition
among employees and employers in labor markets, and firms
always pay the same amount to identical workers. However,
in real-world labor markets, where replacing employees and
finding new jobs can be costly, workers at firms facing expansionary demand on the product market side may be able to
negotiate higher wages, regardless of the state of the outside
labor market. Understanding how and why employers behave
in practice is important for assessing the impact of labor market interventions that target specific employers in large, global
labor markets. Moreover, if wages are determined noncompetitively within firms in separate “internal labor markets”
(Doeringer and Piore 1971), this might also in turn account
for the well-documented role of firms in pay inequality found
around the globe (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999; Barth
et al. 2016; Card et al. 2016; Song et al. 2015).
In this paper, we study how employers respond to changes
in product market conditions that incentivize them to produce. Our goal is to test how much and under what circumstances firms raise wages to match heightened production
goals—even when wage competition from rival employers
remains unchanged. Such a test is difficult to implement
in practice, as one needs to isolate a source of variation in
demand conditions that affects output, employment, and
wages but that is also, first, uncorrelated with any changes in
the skills and effort employees bring to the table, and second,
not associated with a general change in demand among rival
employers. Several studies to date examine how changes in
wage correlate with changes in output or productivity (Alvarez et al. 2018; Card, Devicienti, and Maida 2013; Guiso,
Pistaferri, and Schivardi 2005); however, the conclusions
that can be drawn from such studies are limited by the
possibility that changes in output are driven either by labor
supply (rather than labor demand) or by changes in labor
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demand that are common to entire markets. This paper
attempts to fill that gap.
To assess the extent to which wages respond to firms’
internal labor demand rather than labor market competition,
this paper studies a novel natural experiment that idiosyncratically changed the individual firms’ product demand—
without affecting conditions at their closest labor-market
competitors. We study how much Portuguese exporters’ ability to sell during the global Great Recession was impacted
by where—but not what—they had been selling before 2008.
As different countries’ import demands for any given product
were jolted in unpredictable ways during this turbulent
period, otherwise similar exporters experienced unexpectedly
differential changes in product demand based solely on who
their customers were—even those selling the same product.
We follow a budding strain in the literature on international trade (Berman, Berthou, and Hericourt 2015; Hummels et al. 2014; Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano 2016) and
use very detailed data on how much of each detailed product
variety each firm exported to each overseas destination to
create measures of exposure to each foreign market. We then
combine these exposure measures with observed changes
in importing at each of those destinations during the Great
Recession to create a measure of how much each firm’s
export demand changed based on overseas conditions.
Importantly, we implement a novel decomposition of the
export demand change into two components: one reflecting
global changes in product demand that might have affected
many firms in a product market, and another that measures
how much purchases of that product in the specific destination changed compared to other countries.
We show that while both components have meaningful
impacts on firms’ product and labor demand conditions,
as evidenced by sales and payrolls, the former “common”
component also affects the sales and payrolls of other close
competitors. However, the second “idiosyncratic” component
of an exporter’s demand shock impacts that specific firm,
but it otherwise has no effect on close competitors. This
offers precisely the sort of quasi-experimental differences
in demand across firms necessary to test how much internal
demand incentivizes firms to adjust wages.
We find that, even in the absence of a marketwide demand
shift, the wages of prerecession employees adjust significantly in response to firm-level demand changes. A demand
shift resulting in 10 percent more output results in a 1.5 percent larger rise in hourly wages for those incumbent workers.
These effects arise primarily within continuous employment
spells at the initial employer, suggesting that these wage
changes reflect bargaining power within the firm—and not an
increase in general human capital.
In our Portuguese setting, this bargaining power may arise
in part from institutional restrictions on firing. Consistent
with high firing costs, we find that employers also respond to
production demand shocks by hiring more or fewer work-
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ers—but not by firing existing employees. In addition, we
find that in sectors where wage effects exist, they are widely
shared across workers of different pay level, skill levels,
genders, and occupations.
However, wages do not respond in the same manner in all
settings. Consistent with theories of firm-specific human capital (Becker 1962; Lazear 2009), costly searches for workers
with unique skills (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994), and
institutional firing costs (Lazear 1990), we find that wages
only respond to firm-level demand in sectors with higher barriers to employee turnover, which we infer based on low quit
rates and longer tenures. In sectors with high barriers to turnover we find that the wage incidence of firm demand shocks
is quite high: A shock that changes output by 10 percent
leads to a 3 percent wage increase. By contrast, in sectors
with low turnover costs, wages are mostly pinned down by
labor market competition, and we find no evidence that firms
adjust wages based on their own demand conditions. These
findings suggest that turnover costs play an important role in
wage determination—the easier it is to replace workers, the
less wages reflect internal labor demand within the firm as
opposed to labor market competition.
These findings suggest that wages among otherwise
identical workers can vary substantially due to circumstances
at their firms that are beyond their control. Moreover, our
estimates can reconcile a puzzle in the earlier literature of
pay difference across firms: Card et al. (2016) find that while
firms with 10 percent higher labor productivity levels have
1.5 percent higher pay premiums in cross-sectional comparisons, nonexperimental studies that correlated changes in pay
with changes in firm output rarely find wage increases large
enough to rationalize the general productivity-pay relationship. By contrast, in our experimental study, we find a causal
relationship between firms’ output growth and wages that is
much larger than implied by correlation analyses (including
our own), and that exactly matches the cross-sectional productivity-pay relationship. When we use our causal estimates
to predict the amount of wage variance that should arise from
differences in firm performance, we account for roughly
the same share of the total variance in wages explained by
firm-level pay premiums in the common decomposition from
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Thus, our estimates
imply that changes in pay policy in response to employer
performance can plausibly generate large cross-firm wage
differentials—as long as there are sufficiently large barriers
to replacing workers. These findings highlight the value of
analyzing natural-experimental evidence in understanding
the factors that drive wage determination.
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Chapter 2
Putting America to Work, Where? Evidence on
the Effectiveness of Infrastructure Construction
as a Locally Targeted Employment Policy
This paper studies spending on public infrastructure
construction projects—in particular, “shovel-ready” projects
that can commence immediately upon funding—a frequently
proposed policy intended to boost local construction employment and overall economic health. Such projects can target
particular geographies in a highly visible way, making them
intuitively appealing as way to boost employment in distressed areas. These projects inherently create a demand for
construction laborers to go to work in precise locations. As
a result, one might expect that approving a project in a place
will increase local employment in the construction sector,
and perhaps increase employment more broadly in turn as
construction workers spend their earnings locally. Despite
the intuitive appeal of these arguments, however, it is important to evaluate whether the data support them.
To test these hypotheses, I study the 2009 American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Recovery Act), which
authorized $27 billion for supplemental shovel-ready road
construction projects that could commence promptly, with
priority given to economically distressed areas. In contrast
to standard federal road expenditures, the Recovery Act
required detailed reporting about all stimulus road construction projects nationwide. This provides a unique opportunity to study the local employment effects of infrastructure
spending.
Using the Recovery Act’s spatially detailed data on
infrastructure spending, I test whether places that received
relatively more funding experienced more favorable employment outcomes than those that received relatively less using
a variable treatment intensity difference-in-differences
design. To the extent that construction workers might have
been engaged in other construction work in the absence of
the stimulus measure, counting bodies at project sites is
insufficient; one must determine causal effects of spending
relative to the no-spending counterfactual. To this end, I use
a rich local-level data set to consider the plausibility of a
selection-on-observables methodology. Contrary to concerns
that funds were systematically targeted to places with unobservable worse downturns, I find surprisingly little evidence
of any targeting based on observable employment trends.
One advantage of studying government highway spending is that there is a clear transmission mechanism by which
expenditures should affect local employment. The first-order
“direct effect” should be on employment of construction
workers involved in the projects themselves, and there
should be a “local multiplier effect” on nonconstruction
employment in the same region only to the extent that those
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workers’ expenditures support additional jobs. For any local
multiplier effect to be plausible, it is necessary to first establish a credible direct effect on the construction sector.
I find that highway construction did have a direct effect on
construction employment at the county level. In particular,
$1.00 of additional Recovery Act spending on local construction increased local construction payrolls by $0.30 during the
five years after the act’s passage, almost exactly labor’s share
of construction revenues nationwide. These labor market
effects were largest in 2010 and dissipated gradually over the
following years. I find no evidence of differential preperiod
trends across differently treated counties, supporting the
identification assumption that all effects are causal results of
additional stimulus spending. The finding that the magnitude
of the direct effect is roughly what one would expect with
zero crowd-out suggests that targeted Recovery Act spending
during the Great Recession did not crowd out other local
construction. However, I find that commuting matters in that
local spending only impacts local employment in more isolated locales with smaller populations and smaller fractions
of residents who travel to outside counties for work. When I
test for effects in nearby commuting origins or destinations, I
find some evidence of commuting spillovers, but the estimates are highly imprecise.
When I test for general equilibrium effects on the total
employment and payroll levels within locales, I find effects
close to zero, with very wide confidence intervals across all
specifications. I find evidence suggesting that places with
less commuting penetration have larger total employment
effects, but the results are too imprecise to conclude that
there is a large local multiplier anywhere. In sum, although I
do not find evidence of large local multipliers, I cannot rule
them out. A local multiplier of zero could simply indicate
that the multiplier effects of localized spending are highly
spatially diffuse; yet, an imprecise zero estimate may also
merely reflect a lack of statistical power. While the Recovery
Act was a significant enough intervention to have a sizable
effect on the construction sector in low-mobility counties,
the local variation in highway spending may have been too
small relative to baseline regional volatility to detect a local
multiplier.
Importantly, although the magnitude of the effects on the
construction sector is what one might expect in the absence
of crowd-out, the implied cost per job I estimate is high
relative to other estimates in the literature. My estimate of
five construction job-years per $1 million implies that one
construction job-year requires $200,000 in highway spending
to be sustained. While I find a larger impact on construction
employment compared to the state-level findings than in
Leduc and Wilson (2017), the cost per construction job-year
is much more expensive than the roughly $30,000 cost per
total job-year in Suarez Serrato and Wingender (2014) and
Buchheim and Watzinger (2017). In order to reconcile the
construction employment effects I find—which imply a cost
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per construction job of $200,000—with a $30,000 cost per
total job, a construction job would have to result in the creation of five additional nonconstruction jobs. While not ruled
out by my estimated effects on total employment, this is not
plausible based on prior studies of local employment multipliers, which typically find that an exogenous one job-year
increase in low-skill work supports only one additional job in
the same metropolitan area (Moretti 2010; van Dijk 2016).

Chapter 3
Public Investment and the Spread of “GoodPaying” Manufacturing Jobs: Evidence from
World War II’s Big Plants
In this paper, I study the long-run local labor market
effects of the publicly financed construction of large manufacturing facilities during World War II (WWII). Many
have hypothesized that the postwar expansion of high-wage
manufacturing employment and associated “Great Compression” in the earnings distribution was a direct result
of the industrial mobilization for the war (Goldin and
Margo 1992; Piketty 2014). This paper provides a direct test
of this conjecture. In doing so, it speaks directly to a core
question for economic policymakers: Can a brief public
intervention have beneficial impacts on labor markets that
persist well beyond the period of government intervention?
Understanding the answer is vital to understanding whether
industrial policy is justified in developing regions, whether
place-based labor policies can help the middle class, and
the extent to which infrastructure shapes how urban clusters form and persist. However, opportunities to study this
question directly are extremely rare—big “pushes” are few
and far between, and when they do occur in the form of plant
openings or major infrastructure works, they are typically
systematically targeted at places that are expected to grow or
to stagnate.
The industrial expansion for WWII provides a unique
opportunity to study this question. Due to the short-run
military emergency, political and military leaders demanded
that the United States increase its domestic industrial output
nearly threefold over the course of only three or four years.
This increment to output primarily consisted of airplanes,
ships, ordnance (guns and ammunition of all varieties),
explosives, and the metals and chemicals used in the production of those various types of matériel. Although the military
attempted to incentivize firms to put their own capital on the
line and build plants as necessary, for some particularly large
plants in secure locations, these incentives were insufficient to attract any private investment, particularly when an
expensive plant was built to churn out a product that was
insufficiently similar to products more likely to be demanded
during peacetime. In these cases, the plants were ordered and
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owned by the U.S. government. As the private sector was
unwilling to finance plant construction at the sites selected
by the U.S. government, it is unlikely that similar plants
would have been sited in the same locations if not for the
war. These large, durable, public plants are more plausibly
located for quasi-random short-run reasons than any comparable infrastructure investment in Western history.
To estimate the effects of siting a large plant in a specific
locale, I compare counties that received large and completely
federally funded plants to counties that were observably
similar at the dawn of the Great Depression. My conjecture
is that in the absence of a war, neither the control nor the
treatment counties would have had such an additional plant
open; the only reason potential outcomes differ across treatment and control counties were circumstances created by
the war. I hone in on control groups using several methods,
although the choice of method does not significantly impact
the results. To estimate the effects of plant sitings I adopt a
difference-in-differences approach: After verifying that labor
market conditions in treatment and control locales evolved
similarly prior to WWII, I study how much more employment and wages rose in the treated locales compared to the
control locales. I find evidence that among similar counties,
publicly financed plants were as good as randomly assigned.
By contrast, plants that received substantial private funding
seem to be systematically located in regions experiencing
higher prewar industrial expansion. This supports my focus
on government-financed plants.
I find that the construction of a large industrial plant
during WWII had a large and persistent effect on the local
labor market, with particularly pronounced effects on the
manufacturing wage. After the postwar reconversion, manufacturing employment in counties grew by 30 percent and
remained elevated until the 1980s. Moreover, the average
wage of local production-line workers rose by 10 percent,
and this resulting wage differential persisted beyond even
the 1980s. I find that these manufacturing sector effects are
associated with a general increase in median family incomes
and, to a lesser extent, with higher wages in other sectors.
These findings highlight the large role that governmentsupported manufacturing expansions played in the spread
of “good-paying” midcentury manufacturing jobs. These
long-lived effects were the result of the initial investments
during the war, not continued government or military investment. In fact, the most persistent effects were because of the
groups of plants most likely to be reconverted for civil purposes—those making planes, tanks, and steel—rather than
specialized ordnance plants that tended to cater to military
production throughout the Cold War era. However, while
government spending on investment in manufacturing capital
complimentary to labor had large effects, I find that wartime
government spending in general did not boost wages in a
similar manner, consistent with earlier work by Fishback and
Cullen (2013). The effects I identify are large in magnitude
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relative to the costs: At a 10 percent local income tax rate,
local governments would have recovered roughly half of
the cost of the plant construction from the payroll increment
alone.
This work adds to a growing literature evaluating the
regional effects of place-based policies and large manufacturing investments. A study of “million dollar plants” that
opened in the 1980s and 1990s (Greenstone, Hornbeck, and
Moretti 2010) finds that while new plant sitings increase
regional productivity, there were limited effects on local
earnings; however, little is known about whether plant sitings
had similar effects when manufacturing plants offered better
work opportunities midcentury. Research on the Tennessee
Valley Authority by Moretti and Kline (2014) finds that a
major regional development push in the 1930s had long-run
impacts, but it is difficult to conclude which aspects of the
policy drove the results.
While the identification of persistent effects on average
wages is of interest, the implications for policy depend on
the reason for the wage increases. On one hand, the increase
in local average wages may reflect an actual increase in
earnings opportunities for certain individuals—those who
would have resided near the plant in any circumstance and
who might have gained access to better jobs and work experience with the plant siting. On the other hand, the rise in
local wages might merely reflect an inflow of skilled workers
drawn to the new plant that would have earned the same
higher wage in any case, but perhaps in another location. In
this latter scenario, the investment might only change where
people work without affecting any single individual’s earning
opportunities. I propose a method to distinguish between
these two scenarios by studying the long-run effects of plant
siting on the individuals residing in county before WWII,
rather than annual county-level aggregates. I discuss plans to
use longitudinally linked microdata to extend the study along
these lines.
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